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 Social sciences in general and the religion ones in particular, “move forward” in a “slow”, 
heterogeneous, complex way, obviously, never in a lineal one. We would say that they “do not move 
forward”, or they only do it with a special notion of moving forward: they do it by sophisticating some 
debates, even when there are positions that pretend to synthesize and overcome polarities and 
antinomies, as it often happens every thirty years, after the alternating phases of dominance of a 
position and its opposite one. Certain positions that for some are more than overcome, for others have a 
value that is not only residual but substantive to understand a phenomenon. There, for example, where 
it is claimed that a definitive new conceptualization of religion as a market, it will have a complete, 
corrosive, and for many undeniable, return to one of the primary enunciations of the social sciences and 
its questioning regarding the ahistorical character of conceptions in this case reduced to an economic 
sense. Thus we see a breakthrough in a position when it allows us to hold renewals and overcomes that 
are possible and required to extend, sharpen, intensify the arguments, some of the interpretative 
alternatives that are part of certain disputes that, let’s hope you forgive me, it’s not an exaggeration, are 
"eternal". Thereby, our discussions move forward, more for the sophistication of the debate than for its 
abolition. 
 In this context, I would like to highlight and discuss some of the issues that “Religious 
Pluralism and Value Pluralism: ritual and regulation of intercultural diversity” illuminates, by allowing 
to develop a decidedly richer form of discussion. My thesis, highlighting a possible angle, is that from 
this text we can reconstruct the notion of religious pluralism both in their areas of application and 
content. We need to be clear at this point: if Robbins’ thesis takes away the issue of religious pluralism 
and perches on pluralism of values, it does not mean that his work has no impact on the question of 
religious pluralism. On  the contrary. As we know "from afar, or from somewhere else we can have a 
better view" and it is the truth of that proverb which I think is at stake when we perceive one of the 
possible parables in the text. My intention is to return to the issue of value pluralism as it is treated by 
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Robbins to apply it in its consequences to  the religious pluralism. I don’t think that Robbins’ 
exploration has escaped the theme, but I understand that the text offers us the possibility of an 
enlightening rodeo. Based on this possibility, I distinguish three issues that operate in the text and must 
be conceived as chained moments of that elucidation. 
A first issue that I find essential, to draw a conclusion about the text without compromising the 
author himself in this, is: if the displacement of the question of religious pluralism to pluralism of 
values is one of the maneuvers that the text makes, it should be noted that there is another one that also 
arises as a “limitation” of the author, but it is quite instructive. The fact that the field of research of the 
author is offered as one of the privileged poles of a taxonomy that is usually assumed to analyze 
religious phenomena, helps overcome that same taxonomy and the assumption that it poses. Let us be 
clear: if the empirical study corresponds to a “simple", small society in which the rules could be sensed 
as homogeneous and real, what it follows is a denial. Small can be beautiful, but in no way simple.  
 This brings us to an assumption that I would like to make even if the author does not authorize 
me: normative homogeneity, whether it is in a religion or in a society, is a myth of some analyses . And 
this does not imply the metaphysical claim of chaos and unintelligibility, nor  ontological individualism 
but the fact that the function of any system of meanings supposes the start of game repetitions and 
differentiation in which the illusions of constant, identical and perennial reproduction sink. The 
intention is not to deny duration, "historical inertia”, social determination of the individual, the 
structural gaze. But it is not possible to say that the determinant structures do not have, as part of its  
functioning regime, changing margins and changing margins of their own changing margins. The 
normative homogeneity is a hypothetical degree zero that has never been fulfilled since every initial 
narrative of a society, every  regulatory complex of a social aggregate, as simple as it is, from the 
beginning it is subjected differences that are introduced, even within a limited field. In that sense, I 
think that the text supports this without fully assuming that the axiological plurality is constitutive of  
social life and the religious experience, for both individuals and institutions (a statement that often 
mixes an assumption of facts with a normative projection). Hence, from this point, two issues emerge 
that I would also like to provide to the discussion. 
 The second issue is that the idea of a constitutive axiological pluralism, as well as the one of a  
constitutive pluralism of religions, must be combined in a non-mechanical way with the meaning 
ascribed to the term pluralism. If by pluralism we understand its modern comprehension, its liberal 
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meaning, we are forced to summarize the constitutive plurality and its existence into a scheme that  
involves relative rules on "tolerance", acceptance and encouragement of diversity and even a sanction 
to the conceptions that seek to integrate in a subordinated way the mentioned diversity. That 
perspective can be normatively valid, insofar  as I understand it is what engages me as a citizen, but it 
is epistemologically inconsistent. The aspect of the Dumontian vision outlined by Robbins denounces  
and resolves this inconsistency: the constitutive pluralism can be resolved in non-pluralist conceptions. 
The normative and religious plurality can be hierarchical, even without easy harmonies. An example of 
this tension for me is offered by some of the Argentine Catholics of the popular sectors that can admit 
that, in case of need of  a "stronger" prayer, they can go to an evangelical pastor, but they prefer not to 
because that would be  mean  to "denationalize “ themselves. This way of classifying the alternatives 
turns out to be at the same time revealing and surprising. In one trajectory the options are present in the 
form of plural options of value and religion. But in this case something particular happens: from the 
point of view of  one who  chooses an evangelical pastor to save his health, there is the terrible 
consequence of losing their Argentine identity. In this case religious plurality is not denied in the facts 
nor in the rules or rights under “ the custom”, the real existing rules beyond the the national 
constitution (even when these  real existing rules are egalitarian). But if the religious plurality is not 
denied nor certain exercises that correspond to its recognition, it is prioritized in a way that its 
recognition and the right to the option are hugely expensive (in a situation like the one I have 
mentioned, everything is dramatic: lose the  nationality that is understood for example, as the fraternity 
with neighbors, or as a blood mark or lose the health). A little bit more about this particular situation 
can be added: the pluralism that actually exists in it does not separate religion and politics in a " 
classical" way. For the long-term effects of the attempt to establish a Catholic Argentina, we find that 
the popular appropriation of that intention gives holy and fraternal value at the same time to the 
nationality, as an effect of a Pentecostal evangelization based on divine healing is that there is a 
differentiation and hierarchy of religions based on their differential abilities either to "cure " or 
“integrate". A differentiation and a hierarchy that also varies depending on the situation. This applies 
both to pluralism of values  and to religions: it is necessary to address not only the pluralism that we 
take as natural, but the way that is qualified in a particular symbolic universe. The case I refer to , that 
of a hierarchical pluralism, on a local, "informal" level but widespread in popular experiences in 
Argentina shows, I hope, the need for this distinction. 
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 The third issue is that the decision to move from religious pluralism to the question of value 
pluralism allows us to grasp in a more realistic way a number of contemporary problems of the analysis 
of religion in the social sciences. Even when this decision may appear in the text as a result of a 
limitation or a conditioning derived from the  research trajectory itself, I think this is a productive 
decision that installs at the same time an alternative and necessary point of view. The analysis of 
religious experience seems to concede, many more times than necessary, to the prejudice that each 
religion represents an axiological articulation that has in its center a value. In this conception is 
admitted that that axiological articulation may have other values, but it is assumed that they are part of 
a neat joint, where tensions are overcome because besides distinctions, there are hierarchies that reset a 
verticality and an order in the chaos of horizontality. This arises from many visions, including  those 
quoted by Robbins. I would like to stress the predominance of what we usually recognize as the 
"Dumontian ontology" in an area where it is less liable of a productive rescue than in the previous 
issue. And the reference is not accidental: first because this ontology, and some of its  uses in 
particular, has a decisive influence in the Brazilian anthropology that is the host of this debate, in  the 
effect to give a permanent and a specific form to the Durkheimian vision, including what it takes to 
overcome it (no disrespect to the founding fathers and still understanding the decisive productive role 
that the appropriation of the work of Dumont in Brazil has). The Durkhemian vision extends, not just in 
Brazil where it exerts its weight in a direct and noticeable way, the assumption that religions have a 
value in the center, this conceptual construction projects to the religious world to which it is applied, a 
particular religious experience, that is not controlled or reviewed or exposed: that “mere unconscious 
pattern" is Catholicism. From that assumption, expectations that were translated into unproven 
hypotheses are derived and, precisely for this, oblige us into the discussion. One of those challenged 
expectations is, as known, that religious diversity has not translated in Latin America into a normative 
plurality that did not exist since "before the religious diversity”. It has not been Pentecostalism, 
assumed as a form of “protestantism” that reformed Latin America, as speculated1. Neither in a type of 
socio-religious conflict in which men will fight with each other in a frontal definitive and excluding 
way, opposing armies faced to gods and different values. But if we consider a less drastic version of the 
idea of conflict we should say that neither has been the religious diversity the responsible for 
introducing in an autonomous way, separate from other social processes, values once subordinated and 
emerging, and deployed in the open as individualism. To return to the case of Pentecostalism, we 
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should say that sometimes, in confluence with other variables, it is a factor of that individualization 
(but it can not be associated exclusively and uniquely to individualization).  
 Nevertheless, this assumption that should be exceeded, still remains as the prerogative every 
time it is assumed that the normal state of a religion is the axiological consistency and kind of 
equivalent of “society”. In this context, Robbins’s work helps to consolidate an essential first 
denaturalization: the structural heterogeneity that can be captured if the observer sits on the plurality of 
values as a starting point of the description. Heterogeneity that crosses religious spaces as evidenced by 
the same work. And the flip side of this phenomenon is that these same values that make a religion 
more heterogeneous, may also be turning a society in a more heterogeneous one. In that sense, moving 
to the pluralism of values to understand the religious experiences (how people deal with, ..), not only 
has "more of a reality principle" but helps place something that should not have to have the character of 
novelty, or exception, but it is crucial in the analysis of the social dynamics of religious phenomena: 
religious transversality. A perception that has two dimensions. On one side a religion is appraisingly 
heterogeneous and is crossed by the heterogeneity of society. On the other hand no value corresponds 
exclusively to one religion. The inability to define the life of a religious group from the point of view of 
the claims of its potential leaders, especially if they carry a "monistic" conception is parallel to the one 
that, ignoring that fact, we social scientists, when imbued with the same prejudice, stay catholic centric 
(a religion = a value = a hierarchical and complex harmonized set of values). At this point the analysis 
of the diversity of rituals from within “a religion" that shows their internal plurality, and their crosses 
and their commonalities with other religions and other social processes in which the plurality of values 
is performed, is a key finding in the text to which I would allow myself to add some examples. Inner 
healing rituals that link through a mixture of psychoanalysis and exorcism an individualistic 
construction are common in Argentina both to Catholics and Pentecostal groups. Conversely the 
holistic readings of baptism, massively present in argentinian Catholicism are also present in rituals 
such as the presentation of children to the Lord in Pentecostalism: in either case it is ensured not only 
the incorporation but also health as a result of a "real" incorporation. The plurality of rituals that 
different religious groups have, can articulate plural axiological experiences in supposedly 
homogeneous religious spaces. The conception of a "natural" religious transversality combined with a 
constitutive pluralism should be a permanent point of view. A spotlight that although counterintuitive 
and always difficult to conquer, is the starting point to ensure the break with the "pre-notions" of great 
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concern to social scientists. If so, we should conclude that societies, in its value anatomy, as well as 
religions, have a different architecture that is assumed by the unrelativized gaze anchored in the 
universality of the Catholic experience: it is not built from the top apex of the pyramids in which all the 
diverse and dispersed in the base contributes to the same axial line without potential leak points that 
integrate other possible axes and planes. Discernment of heterogeneous normativity of religions and the 
corresponding transversality of the religious experience in value terms should therefore accompany the 
significance of Catholic centrism transcendence often present in the social sciences of religion. 
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